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CONFLICT OF LAWS-WHERE JURISDICTION IS BASED ON Di-
VERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP, FEDERAL COURTS FACED WITH QUES-
TIONABLE STATE PRECEDENT MAY MAKE ANTICIPATORY
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF STATE LAW. Riess v. .Murchison (9th.
Cir. 1967).
In June of 1955 Mr. and Mrs. Riess, residents of California, con-
tracted to sell to G. W. Murchison, a resident of Texas, a three and
one-half acre parcel of land located in Ventura County, California.
After a downpayment, the rate of the remaining payments was to be
determined by the amount of water that could be produced from the
purchased property. Similarly, the amount and sufficiency of the
water on the land was to be the determining factor controlling the
buyer's duty to construct a reservoir and install a pipeline on the land.
In the event of a disagreement as to the sufficiency of the water, the
question was to be submitted to arbitration. After fifteen months of
compliance with the terms of the agreement, the buyer refused to
make further monthly payments, alleging among other things,' that
because the water on the purchased property was insufficient, his
duty to build and install the reservoir and pipeline did not arise.
Alleging a breach by repudiation, the seller-plaintiffs brought an
action in the federal district court, jurisdiction being based on the
diversity of citizenship of the parties. Plaintiffs maintained that, since
the buyers had repudiated the contract, arbitration could not properly
be allowed under California law2 and that the federal court was
bound by that state's precedent. After extended litigation,3 however,
the district court ordered the issue of sufficiency of the water sub-
mitted to arbitration. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
1 The buyers also alleged that they had made certain "voluntary payments" in
advance, and were not behind in their payments because the advance payments should
have been credited against the balance which accrued during the period of the dispute.
There were two defendants because Murchison assigned the contract to Simi Valley
Development Co. before the suit was brought.
2 Hanes v. Coffee, 212 Cal. 777, 300 P. 963 (1931).
3 At the intial trial in the district court, it was found that the defendant's duty to
build the reservoir was absolute, so that the question of sufficiency of water, and thus
arbitration of that question was not relevant. On a subsequent appeal by both sides,
the salient portion of the circuit court's decision was to the effect that the sufficiency
of the water on the purchased property was quite material to the case. The circuit court
further held that "[i]f the present case is one which is otherwise proper for arbitration
the buyers are entitled to have the question of sufficiency settled by arbitration." Riess v.
Murchison, 329 F.2d 635, 644 (9th Cir. 1964). Notwithstanding seller's allegations
of total repudiation by buyers, the circuit court pointed out that the district court had
held on remand that the buyers were not "in default or otherwise precluded from
proceeding with arbitration," and that the case was "otherwise proper for arbitration."
384 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1967).
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peals, held, order requiring arbitration sustained: The question of
repudiation is irrelevant to the propriety of arbitration because Cali-
fornia courts would, if confronted with this situation, disregard
precedent and require arbitration. Riess v. Murchison, 384 F.2d 727
(9th Cir. 1967).
In rendering this decision, the circuit court was confronted with a
problem that has been in the background of our federal-state judicial
system since the celebrated case of Erie v. Tompkins.4 Under Erie
and its progeny,5 the task of a federal judge in diversity cases is to
act as a state court judge in applying substantive law. Writing for a
unanimous Court in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field,' Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes affirmed this proposition by declaring that it was un-
acceptable "that there should be one rule of state law for litigants in
the state courts and another rule for litigants who bring the same
question before the federal courts .. . ." Under the Erie doctrine it
is clear that, in diversity cases, the substantive aspects of the case are
to be determined according to the law of the forum state.
The question raised by Riess, and not authoritatively answered by
Erie and its descendants, is: How, and from what source does the
federal court judge glean the state law which Erie requires to be
applied? With reference to the facts of the Riess case, more par-
ticularly the question is whether a federal court can anticipate a
change in state law which has not yet been declared by the state
court?
Before examining how Riess and other cases have dealt with this
problem, it should be pointed out that however the question is de-
cided, the answer may still produce the proclivity to forum shop which
Erie sought to prevent. If a federal court is of the opinion that the
law of the state may be determined only by viewing existing state
precedent, no matter what the vintage, "[the] lawyer whose case is
dependent on an old or shaky state court decision which might no
longer be followed within the state, or not obtain the approval of the
highest court of the state, will have a strong incentive to maneuver
the case into a federal court ...,, where the antiquated precedent
will be mechanically applied. The net result of this change in
4 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
6 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
7 Id. at 180.
8 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 205 (1963).
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forums is inequality in judicial administration, with its alleged atten-
dant denial of equal protection of the law.
An alternative, but one which leads to the same problem, is pre-
sented by the federal court which believes it can anticipate what state
law will become. If the anticipatory pronouncement of state law is
based on a clear judicial trend, and there appear to be no ambiguities
or undercurrents of doubt existing in the state, the decision to disre-
gard an antiquated precedent is probably the only correct one."0
Clearly, however, the danger in federal predictions of state law lies in
the possibility that they may never be adopted by the state. Thus,
although opposite in approach from the strict, mechanical method
outlined above, the result will be just as inimical to the goals of the
Erie doctrine.
A brief survey of the cases indicates that there is no unanimity of
opinion in the federal courts as to the permissible scope of a federal
judge's inquiry so as to ascertain the current status of state law. In
Turnknett v. Keaton," the appellant asked the Fifth Circuit to
disregard two Texas decisions handed down 16 and 24 years earlier
that had denied a cause of action for injuries to an unborn child. The
appellant contended that the trend of modern decisions in other
jurisdictions was toward a more liberal rule and requested the circuit
court to hold that the Texas judiciary would adopt the modern de-
cisions. The circuit court held that the Erie principle prevented it
from taking cognizance of the trend, and, instead, followed the exist-
ing Texas opinions. 2 The Fifth Circuit reached a like conclusion in
the case of Polk County v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co." There, Polk
County sought to recover premiums it had paid the appellee insurance
company to provide workmen's compensation coverage for county
employees. Appellant contended that a 32-year-old opinion of the
9 Although the Erie decision has been cited for the proposition that reaching different
results on the same question of law in federal and state courts is a denial of equal
protection of the law (see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)), the opinion
has been expressed in many quarters that there was not sufficient basis for reaching the
result based upon the equal protection clause. See C. WiUGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 56,
at 197 (1963).
Whether the constitutional underpinning of the Erie role should be the equal pro.
tection clause or some other part of the Constitution, e.g., the residuary clause of the
loth amendment, the goal of the Erie doctrine remains the same; the same outcome
whether suit be brought in the federal or state courts.
10 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
31 266 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1959).
12 Id.
18 262 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1959).
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Georgia Supreme Court14 prohibited such payments by counties.
Appellee, on the other hand, asserted that the present weight of
authority would allow such payments, and the district court, citing
several intermediate Georgia court cases,' 5 agreed. Denouncing this
approach by the district court as an attempt "to psychoanalyze state
court judges rather than to rationalize state court decisions,"' ' the
circuit held:
We are not permitted to overrule a decision of the Supreme
Court of Georgia on any theory that the Georgia Supreme Court,
as presently constituted, would not be bound by what it had said
when differently constituted some years ago. Nor can we apply, in
diversity cases, a rule of stare decisis which permits us to weigh the
degree of authority .. with the spirit of the times. The Georgia
courts can overrule their prior decisions. The Federal Courts cannot
do so.17
Contrary to this reasoning, federal courts in other circuits have
indicated that they do have the power to disregard state supreme
court decisions which apparently have been ignored in subsequent
opinions in the state or, though never expressly overruled,18 have
become discredited by recent dictum. In Mason v. American Emery
Wheel Works0 the district court, sitting in Rhode Island, came to
the "reluctant" conclusion that it was bound by a Mississippi decision
made 29 years before which required privity of contract between
manufacturer and user before the latter could recover for harm caused
by the former's negligence2 In reversing the district court, the First
Circuit observed:
Of course it is not necessary that a case be explicitly overruled in
order to lose its persuasive force as an indication of what the law is.
A decision may become so overloaded with illogical exceptions that
by erosion of time it may lose its persuasive or binding force even
in the inferior courts of the same jurisdiction.21
After noting that the Mississippi Supreme Court was cognizant of
the present trend to disregard privity, the federal court held that if
'4 Floyd County v. Scoggins, 164 Ga. 485, 139 S.E. 11 (1927).
35 262 F.2d 486, 489.
3. Id.
17 Id. at 490. For instances of similar reasoning by federal courts see Smithey v. St.
Louis S.W. Ry., 237 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1956); Barlow v. De Vilbiss Co., 214 F.
Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Bailey v. Erie R.R., 143 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ohio
1956).
18 See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 204 (1963).
19 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957).
20 Id. at 908.
21 Id. at 909.
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this case were to come before the Mississippi court, "Mississippi
[would] declare itself in agreement with the more enlightened and
generally accepted modern doctrine." 2
In another recent case23 involving the determination of a state's
current choice of law rules in connection with the law governing
the performance of a contract, a federal court again anticipated the
outcome of a future state supreme court decision. Holding that the
Alabama Supreme Court would abandon its earlier choice of law rule,
the district court indicated that "[t]here is no Erie ... obligation to
follow the prior decisions of the supreme court where there is some
assurance that the court would now decide otherwise."24
Without explicitly discussing the problem of prognosticating state
law, the circuit court in Riess followed a similar reasoning process in
attempting to ascertain the present status of California law with
respect to arbitration. In its study of California law, the circuit court
was faced with a decision25 directly in point that had been rendered by
the Supreme Court of California 36 years previously and never over-
ruled. In that case the Supreme Court of California ruled that one
who repudiates a contract which contains an arbitration agreement
may not invoke the arbitration section of the contract in subsequent
litigation. Faced with this antiquated pronouncement which had
apparently been contradicted by recent analogous decisions toward
the utilization of arbitration, the Ninth Circuit sought to determine
how the Supreme Court of California would currently answer the
same question. After a well documented search 25 of the current au-
22 Id. at 910.
23 Ideal Structures Corp. v. Levine Huntsville Dev. Corp., 251 F. Supp. 3 (N.D.
Ala. 1966).
24 Id. at 8, n.7 (citations omitted). This case is indicative of the uncertainity of the
federal courts in this area, since the Alabama District Court lies within the Fifth
Circuit (a circuit that has been earlier cited for a strict approach). Consistency with
previous statements by the Fifth Circuit would probably have compelled reversal if the
case had been appealed.
For a striking example of federal judges division on the permissible scope of their
freedom to ascertain state law, compare Ideal Structures Corp. v. Levine Huntsville
Dev. Corp., 251 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ala. 1966), with Barlow v. De Vilbiss Co., 214
F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
25 Hanes v. Coffee, 212 Cal. 777, 300 P. 963 (1931).
26 The court cited several cases which demonstrated that it has long been California
policy to enforce arbitration agreements: Posner v. Grundwald-Marx, Inc., 56 Cal. 2d
169, 363 P.2d 313, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1961); Utah Constr. Co. v. Western Pac. R.R.,
174 Cal. 156, 162 P. 631 (1916); Myers v. Richfield Oil Corp., 98 Cal. App. 2d
667, 220 P.2d 973 (1950). Accord, Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356.
Although by itself this English case would be merely persuasive authority, it was
pointed out that the Heyman decision has been indorsed by several American courts.
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thorities and developments, the Riess court concluded, "the Cali-
fornia courts-which have gained a justified reputation for progres-
sive legal craftmanship-would resolve this difficult question by
reaffirming the language of their more recent decisions ...27 and,
therefore, held that the question of repudiation is immaterial to the
availability of arbitration.
Conceding that these federal predictions of state law have probably
not deviated from what the state courts would actually decide, this
hit-and-miss method of determining state law remains unacceptable.
When federal court judges delve into the amorphous "might-be" law
of the state, there is no assurance that the particular finding will
actually become state law. On the other hand, the opposite result is
certainly unfair to litigants who happen to find themselves in federal
courts which rigidly apply judicially enunciated state law, no matter
how antiquated.
Inasmuch as the equal protection clause of the Constitution and
Erie compel the equal administration of the law, and conceding that
the current methods used by the federal courts fall short of this goal,
it would seem that some method of accurately ascertaining state law
is necessary2 8 The problem is not insoluble.
The simple and probably only sure solution, where state law
appears to be in flux, or where existing precedent is old and unre-
liable, would be to certify the question before the federal trial court
to the state supreme court for an authoritative answer. Such a pro-
cedure has been adopted by Florida2 9 and endorsed by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.80
Faced with an unresolved question of state law (which the Supreme
Court has traditionally attempted to decide before adjudicating con-
27 384 F.2d at 735.
28 See discussion note 9 supra.
29 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961).
Supreme court authorized to receive and answer certificates as to state
law from federal appellate courts:
The supreme court of this state may, by rule of court, provide that, when it
shall appear to the supreme court of the United States, to any circuit court of
appeals of the United States, or to the court of appeals of the District of
Columbia, that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or
propositions of the laws of this state, which are determinative of the said
cause, and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the
supreme court of this state, such federal appellate court may certify such
questions or propositions of the laws of this state to the supreme court of this
state for instructions concerning such questions or propositions of state law,
which certificate the supreme court of this state, by written opinion, may
answer.
80 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
[Vol. 5
RECENT CASES
stitutional questions) the case was remanded so that the question
might be certified to the Supreme Court of Florida for an answer.
Extolling the virtues of Florida's certification procedure, Justice
Frankfurter stated that:
The Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with the
problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved
in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal court to
certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court
of Florida for its decision.31
Two disadvantages of a certification system have been suggestedP
2
First, is the fear that the necessary minimization of the question of
law involved would compel the state supreme court to consider the
issue without sufficient background to come to a proper conclusion.
It would seem that this problem could be obviated by securing from
the litigants their respective points and authorities on the specific
question. This, coupled with the federal court's finding of facts,
would seem to give the state supreme court an adequate background.
Secondly, certification would add delay to what is probably akeady
lengthy litigation."3 Through the use of the litigant's points and
authorities, and by requiring in the certification statute that the
question be answered within 60 days, this objection could be dimin-
ished.
Without a system of certification it seems clear that there is no
accurate and authoritative system whereby doubtful questions of
state law can be resolved. As long as federal courts are unable to
determine with accuracy what the current state law is, the problem
of unequal administration of the law will remain. If equal protection
and equal administration of the law are to be afforded in the federal-
state system, then a certification procedure to accurately determine
state law would seem to be mandatory.
JAMES W. STREET
81 Id. at 212.
32 Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IowA L. .Ev. 629, 646 (1951).
83 Id.
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